Trump Executive Order Calls For More Aggressive Use Of The Buy American Act—An Order Likely To Have More Political Than Practical Effect by Yukins, Christopher R.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2019 
Trump Executive Order Calls For More Aggressive Use Of The Buy 
American Act—An Order Likely To Have More Political Than 
Practical Effect 
Christopher R. Yukins 
George Washington University Law School, cyukins@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Yukins, Christopher R., Trump Executive Order Calls For More Aggressive Use Of The Buy American 
Act—An Order Likely To Have More Political Than Practical Effect (July 31, 2019). 61 Gov. Contractor para. 
219 (July 31, 2019); GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2019-47; GWU Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2019-47. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3432377 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
4-215-508-2       © 2019  Thomson Reuters
Reprinted from The GovernmenT ConTraCTor, with permission of Thomson Reuters. Copyright © 2019. Fur-
ther use without the permission of West is prohibited. For further information about this publication, please 
visit http://legal.thomsonreuters.com, or call 800.328.9352.
Focus 
¶ 219
FEATURE COMMENT: Trump Executive 
Order Calls For More Aggressive Use Of 
The Buy American Act—An Order Likely 
To Have More Political Than Practical 
Effect
President Trump recently issued an executive order, 
EO 13881, 84 Fed. Reg. 34257 (July 15, 2019), calling 
for more aggressive application of the Buy American 
Act. The new order calls for the Federal Acquisition 
Regulatory Council to strengthen domestic prefer-
ences under the Act. The order was long predicted 
as another step in the Trump administration’s ad-
vancing protectionism. Indeed, most of the Trump 
administration’s protectionist initiatives have been 
foreseeable from the outset, for the Trump adminis-
tration has consistently embraced those initiatives 
that provide maximum political benefit at minimum 
cost. But developments since Trump took office—in-
cluding new data that show that the Buy American 
Act applies to a markedly small portion of federal 
procurement, and emerging electronic marketplaces 
that could swallow up much of that small market 
share—may mean the new executive order has far 
more impact politically (both in the U.S. and abroad) 
than it does practically. 
The Executive Order on Revamping the 
“Buy American” Regulations—Trump’s most 
recent executive order, see 61 GC ¶ 217, followed 
an April 2017 executive order (EO 13788), which 
called for executive agencies to “Buy American” when 
possible, 82 Fed. Reg. 18837 (Apr. 21, 2017); 59 GC 
¶ 115, and a Jan. 31, 2019 order (EO 13858), which 
directed agencies to encourage grantees to purchase 
U.S.-made goods in federally funded initiatives, such 
as infrastructure projects, 84 Fed. Reg. 2029 (Jan. 31, 
2019). See Grier, “President’s Buy American Order: 
Raise Domestic Content” (July 22, 2019), trade.dja-
ghe.com/?p=5921.
On its face, the latest executive order seems to 
have more bite. The order notes that it “is the policy 
of the United States to buy American and to maxi-
mize ... the use of goods ... produced in the United 
States,” and that as a result the Trump adminis-
tration “shall enforce the Buy American Act to the 
greatest extent permitted by law.” 
To maximize the impact of the Buy American 
Act, the new order calls for the Federal Acquisition 
Regulatory Council to revamp the Buy American 
Act’s implementing regulations. Those complex 
regulations are set forth at Federal Acquisition 
Regulation subpts. 25.1 (for supplies) and 25.2 (for 
construction materials), 48 CFR subpts. 25.1 & 25.2. 
The current regulations (summarized here for brev-
ity) ask two questions to qualify an item as domestic: 
was the item manufactured in the U.S. , and does 
it contain the requisite U.S. domestic content. E.g., 
FAR 25.001(c)(1). If the item is determined to be of 
foreign origin, the regulations apply a price prefer-
ence (not a bar) to favor competing U.S.-origin items. 
See, e.g.,  Bashur, Stewart and Weinkam, “Current 
Challenges Facing Contractors Under Recent Chang-
es to Domestic Preference Programs,” Procurement 
Law., Winter 2018, at 3, 4.
Trump’s new order calls for regulators to expand 
the domestic content requirements under the Act, 
largely by rewriting the regulatory scheme launched 
by President Eisenhower’s order that has, for over 60 
years, guided enforcement under the Buy American 
Act, Prescribing Uniform Procedures for Certain De-
terminations Under the Buy American Act, EO 10582, 
19 Fed. Reg. 8723 (Dec. 17, 1954). See generally Nib-
ley, Conant and Bakkies, Feature Comment, “Real 
Steps Towards ‘Buy American’ Compliance—Part I: 
Unpacking FAR Pt. 25 and the Application of ‘Buy 
American’ Laws,” 60 GC ¶ 52.
Under that existing regulatory scheme for 
Buy American Act enforcement, covered goods, 
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even if manufactured in the U.S., must include at 
least 50 percent U.S. content. See, e.g., FAR 25.003 
(“ ‘Domestic end product’ means ... [a]n end product 
manufactured in the United States, if ... [t]he cost of 
its components mined, produced, or manufactured 
in the United States exceeds 50 percent of the cost 
of all its components.”). The new order from Presi-
dent Trump would decrease the foreign content 
allowed to only five percent for iron and steel end 
products, and to 45 percent for all other end prod-
ucts. (The order also calls for senior trade officials 
to assess whether the 45-percent limit could, in 
time, be reduced to 25 percent.) Thus, for example, 
if an iron end product included foreign iron that 
constituted more than five percent of the cost of all 
the components used in the end product, that end 
product would be considered of foreign origin under 
the recent executive order.
Proposed Changes to Domestic Content  
Requirements—What Percent Content Makes 
an Item “Foreign” Under the Buy American Act
Iron and Steel 
Items
Other Items
Existing 
Law
50% 50%
Trump 
Proposal 
5% foreign iron 
or steel
45% foreign content 
(could decrease to 25%)
If an item qualifies as “foreign” under the Buy 
American Act test, the next step is to assess the price 
preference. See Green, International Government 
Contract Law § 2.4 (Westlaw Nov. 2018). In simplified 
terms, a domestic item offered by a small business is 
afforded a 12-percent price preference, i.e., award may 
be made to the U.S. item even if it is up to 12 percent 
more expensive, FAR 25.105(b); domestic items of-
fered by other businesses enjoy a six-percent prefer-
ence, id.; and domestic items offered to the Defense 
Department enjoy a 50-percent preference, Defense 
FAR Supplement 252.225-7001. (The 50-percent pref-
erence for Defense Department items is almost never 
seen in practice, perhaps because so much defense 
materiel is covered by reciprocal defense procurement 
agreements between the U.S. and its allies, and those 
agreements remove most barriers to defense trade. 
See generally Miller, “Is It Time to Reform Reciprocal 
Defense Procurement Agreements?,” 39 Pub. Cont. 
L.J. 93 (2009).)
The new Trump order would radically expand 
these Buy American price preferences (though not the 
preference for Defense Department purchases).Under 
the regulations called for by the order, domestic items 
from small businesses would enjoy a 30-percent price 
preference, and those from other businesses would 
have a 20-percent price preference.
Price Preferences Applied Against Foreign 
Items Under Buy American Act
Small Businesses Other Businesses
Existing 
Law
12% price 
preference
6% price 
preference
Trump 
Proposal
30% price 
preference
20% price 
preference
 What the Order Does Not Address—President 
Trump’s executive order calls for the Federal Acqui-
sition Regulatory Council to publish a proposed rule 
for public comment. The order leaves unaddressed a 
number of exceptions and safe harbors under the Buy 
American Act, see, e.g., Buy American Act: Actions 
Needed to Improve Exception and Waiver Reporting 
and Selected Agency Guidance (GAO-19-17), at 4–9, 
www.gao.gov/assets/700/696086.pdf, which may 
complicate the rulemaking and severely limit the 
impact of the new executive order. Those include:
• The Buy American exception for commercially
available off-the-shelf (COTS) items: Under
current regulations, COTS items manufac-
tured in the United States need not contain
a requisite level of domestic content. See 41
USCA § 1907 (exceptions for COTS items); FAR
25.001(c); see also Green, supra, § 2.8 (discuss-
ing legal test for “manufacture”). Nothing in
the order suggests that this exception will be
eliminated; leaving it in place, however, will
limit the new order’s impact.
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Acquisitions Above Trade Agreements 
Thresholds (typically $180,000): 
Buy American Act Does Not Apply
Buy American Act Applies: Acquisi-
tions from $10,000 to the Trade Agree-
ments Thresholds
Micro-Purchases (Currently up to 
$10,000): 
Buy American Act Does Not Apply
• The exception for procurements above the trade
agreements thresholds: What is often over-
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looked is that the Buy American Act does not 
apply to procurements above the thresholds 
set in various international trade agreements; 
those thresholds for supplies range from 
$25,000 (for Canada) to $180,000 (under the 
most important agreement, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement (GPA)). See FAR 25.402. 
Procurements above those thresholds are 
exempt from the Buy American Act, pursuant 
to waiver authority vested in the president 
by the Trade Agreements Act. See, e.g., Grier, 
“Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Broad Author-
ity, Narrow Application” (Apr. 21, 2014), trade.
djaghe.com/?p=559; GAO-19-17, supra at 4. In 
effect, these trade agreements “squeeze down” 
on the Buy American Act, and limit its effect to 
smaller contracts below the trade agreements 
thresholds. Nothing in the new EO suggests 
that those trade agreements will be undone. In 
fact, as is discussed below, because of Canada’s 
unexpected refusal to join the procurement 
provisions in the U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agree-
ment (USMCA), it will be even more difficult 
for the U.S. to abandon existing agreements. 
For now (at least), the latticework of interna-
tional trade agreements opening procurement 
markets seems secure, and those agreements 
leave only a limited scope to the Buy American 
Act.
•	 The safe harbor for goods sold through “cata-
logue” contracts: The international trade agree-
ments typically contain a provision, see, e.g., 
WTO GPA, II.6, echoed in the FAR, see FAR 
25.403, which says that agencies should look 
to the total estimated value of the acquisi-
tion—not the value of an individual order—in 
assessing whether a procurement exceeds 
the trade agreements’ monetary thresholds 
and thus is covered by a trade agreement. In 
practice, this rule means that many catalogue 
contracts (known as “indefinite-delivery/
indefinite-quantity” contracts in the U.S., and 
“framework” agreements internationally) are 
assumed to have total values larger than the 
trade agreements’ monetary thresholds and so 
are not covered by the Buy American Act. 
•	 The exception for acquisitions below the 
micro-purchase threshold—fueled by the 
prospect of new commercial electronic mar-
ketplaces: While international trade agree-
ments “squeeze” the Buy American Act from 
above, micro-purchases erode it from below. 
Micro-purchases are exempt from the Buy 
American Act, see, e.g., Congressional Re-
search Service, Domestic Content Restrictions: 
The Buy American Act and Complementary 
Provisions of Federal Law 7 (R43354, Sept. 
12, 2016), https://www.everycrsreport.com/
files/20160912_R43354_80f139d4eb763ccc
d9a433cba33e81d5567f6f5d.pdf. The scope 
of micro-purchases in the Federal Govern-
ment may grow dramatically in the coming 
years, as users—ordinary federal employees, 
not contracting officials—are allowed to use 
online marketplaces (such as Amazon.com or 
Walmart.com) to purchase goods and services 
for the Federal Government. See generally 
Yukins and Ramish, Feature Comment, “Sec-
tion 809 and ‘E-Portal’ Proposals, By Cutting 
Bid Protests in Federal Procurement, Could 
Breach International Agreements and Raise 
New Risks of Corruption,” 60 GC ¶ 138, ssrn.
com/abstract=3176223. Under a mandate 
from Congress, the General Services Admin-
istration has endorsed the use of electronic 
marketplaces, see GSA, Procurement Through 
Commercial E-Commerce Portals—Phase 
II Report: Market Research & Consultation 
(April 2019), interact.gsa.gov/document/
gsa-and-omb-phase-2-deliverable-attached, 
and a draft solicitation No. 7QSCC19R0429 
(available on www.fbo.gov) for electronic 
marketplaces has been published for com-
ment. That draft solicitation’s statement of 
objectives makes it clear that GSA’s pilot 
electronic marketplaces will be focused, 
at least at first, on sales below the micro-
purchase threshold. Furthermore, while the 
limit on micro-purchases is generally $10,000, 
see OMB Memorandum M-18-18 (June 20, 
2018), GSA has urged Congress to increase 
the micro-purchase threshold to $25,000 for 
purchases through GSA-approved electronic 
marketplaces, see GSA, Procurement Through 
Commercial E-Commerce Portals, supra, at 4. 
If the micro-purchase cap does rise to $25,000, 
it will be even easier for federal buyers to use 
micro-purchases through commercial elec-
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tronic marketplaces to avoid the impact of the 
Buy American Act.
GAO found that foreign products subject to the Buy 
American Act came to under $8 billion—less than 
two percent of annual federal procurement of rough-
ly $500 billion
In part because of these various exceptions and 
safe harbors, the Buy American Act in fact covers a 
relatively small portion of the approximately $500 
billion in annual federal procurement. A recent study 
by the Government Accountability Office found that 
foreign end products accounted for only $7.8 billion 
of fiscal year 2017 obligations for products potentially 
subject to the Buy American Act. GAO-19-17, supra, 
at 11; GAO Finds Inconsistent Buy American Guid-
ance, Inaccurate Procurement Data, 61 GC ¶ 2. That 
very small sliver of the federal procurement budget 
potentially touched by the Buy American Act—less 
than two percent of annual federal procurement 
spending of roughly $500 billion—may shrink even 
further in the coming years, as firms work to take 
advantage of the various exceptions and safe harbors 
from an increasingly onerous Buy American Act. 
These many variables will make it difficult for 
regulators to assess the potential costs and benefits 
of the proposed rule changes, including its impact on 
commercial markets. Cf. Yukins and Cora, Feature 
Comment, “Considering the Effects of Public Procure-
ment Regulations on Competitive Markets,” 55 GC 
¶ 64 (regulators should consider costs and benefits 
when assessing rules with significant economic im-
pact). Beyond the coverage issues outlined above, it will 
be difficult to assess how stricter Buy American pref-
erences may affect procurement outcomes. The price 
preferences put in place under the Buy American Act 
during the Eisenhower administration assumed that 
procurement awards would be based solely on price. 
That is no longer true in many federal procurements; 
statistically, the vast majority of federal procurement 
decisions are now based on “best value” competitive 
assessments which weigh both price and quality. See, 
e.g., Yukins, “The U.S. Federal Procurement System: 
An Introduction,” 2017 Upphandlingsrattslig Tidskrift 
(UrT) 69, 81–82, ssrn.com/abstract=3063559. In this 
new world of “best value” procurement, mere price pref-
erences—even the large price preferences for domestic 
items contemplated by the most recent EO—may cre-
ate a regulatory conundrum. 
Conclusion—The New Executive Order 
and the Trump Protectionist Agenda—As the 
discussion above reflects, ultimately the new execu-
tive order may have relatively little practical effect 
in increasing federal purchases of U.S.-origin goods. 
Even if the order succeeded in sweeping all foreign 
competition from the small share of the federal 
market still potentially covered by the Buy Ameri-
can Act—roughly $8 billion—that would have little, 
if any, real impact on the U.S. trade deficit, which 
rose to $621 billion in 2018. The order’s purpose 
therefore seems largely political, and as such it was 
one of the predictable protectionist steps that the 
Trump administration was likely to take.
In a paper presented in February 2017 to the 
Thomson Reuters Government Contracts Year in 
Review Conference, the author suggested that, by 
assessing the various protectionist options open 
to the Trump administration, and weighing their 
perceived political benefits (in stirring the Trump 
political base) against potential risks and costs, it 
was possible to predict which protectionist mea-
sures the Trump administration would most likely 
press in procurement. The following chart which 
reflected those options in early 2017 has, for the 
most part, proven remarkably prescient:
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officials to “Buy 
American”
Ignore reciprocal 
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American Act
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International Trade and Procurement
 
See Yukins, “International Procurement Develop-
ments in 2016—Part I: The Trump Administration’s 
Policy Options in International Procurement,” 2017 
Gov’t Contracts Year in Review Briefs 3 (Feb. 2017). 
As was explained above, the Trump administration 
has largely followed this predicted path: 
•	 Public	 Pressure	 to	 “Buy	American”: As ex-
pected, Trump did indeed pressure U.S. of-
ficials to “Buy American” in April 2017. See 
EO 13788.
Vol. 61, No. 28 / July 31, 2019 
5© 2019 Thomson Reuters
•	 “Buy	American”	 in	 Infrastructure: Trump’s 
prior EO 13858 called for executive agencies 
to encourage grantees to “Buy American” when 
using federal grants for infrastructure projects. 
Major infrastructure legislation—which Presi-
dent Trump has touted as a trillion-dollar ini-
tiative—is stalled politically, but likely would 
include a “Buy American” provision much like 
Section 1605 of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, which called for the use of 
U.S.-made iron, steel and manufactured items 
in projects funded by that act. 
•	 No	Action	Against	Defense	Procurement	Agree-
ments: The Trump administration has not 
moved to curb the reciprocal defense procure-
ment agreements which open defense markets 
with allies, perhaps because of the costs and 
risk of disrupting sales of military materiel 
abroad. Instead, the Trump administration has 
urged more aggressive foreign military sales. 
See, e.g., Cleary, “U.S. Arms Sales Overseas 
Skyrocketed 33% in 2018,” Breaking Defense, 
Oct. 9, 2018 (“The United States sold $55.6 bil-
lion worth of weapons to allies in fiscal 2018, 
a massive 33 percent increase over 2017 as 
the Trump administration has given the Pen-
tagon and State Department a green light to 
sell more, more quickly, overseas.”), available 
at www.dsca.mil/news-media/news-archive/
us-arms-sales-overseas-skyrocketed-33-2018.
•	 China	and	the	GPA: Any talk of China joining 
the GPA seems to have been drowned out by 
the broader—and intense—trade battles be-
tween the United States and China. 
•	 Renegotiating	Trade	Agreements: President 
Trump issued EO 13796, 82 Fed. Reg. 20819 
(May 4, 2017), which called for a general review 
of trade agreements for fairness; the report on 
that review has never been published, however. 
The Trump administration also tried to reframe 
international procurement agreements by 
demanding dollar-for-dollar reciprocity in the 
USMCA negotiations (a startling departure 
from decades of U.S. trade practice), but was 
rebuffed. Findings from a recent GAO report 
suggested that it would be very difficult to ad-
minister dollar-for-dollar reciprocity (one dollar 
of access to the U.S. federal procurement market 
in return for one dollar of access to a trading 
partner’s market), in part because the data on 
international trade in procurement remains so 
uncertain. See Foreign Sourcing in Government 
Procurement, at 2 (GAO-19-414, May 2019) 
(“U.S. trade policy is being made and inter-
national procurement negotiations conducted 
with limited empirical data available about 
the country of origin of the goods and services 
purchased”), www.gao.gov/assets/700/699393.
pdf. Moreover, during the USMCA negotiations, 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce pointed out that 
strict reciprocity under the USMCA could in 
practice cut existing U.S. access to Mexican pub-
lic procurement markets because Mexican firms 
sell so little to U.S. agencies. Canada, which 
had publicly criticized the concept of strict 
reciprocity, simply refused to join the USMCA’s 
procurement chapter. See Yukins, “International 
Procurement Developments in 2018 – Part IV: 
The United States in International Procure-
ment: Understanding a Pause in the Trump 
Administration’s Protectionism,” 2019 Gov’t 
Contracts Year in Review Briefs 6 (Feb. 2019) 
(citing authorities). By refusing to join, Canada 
may have “locked” the U.S. into the GPA, for if 
Canada does not open its public markets under 
the USMCA and the USMCA replaces the North 
American Free Trade Agreement as planned, 
the GPA—one of the most robust of the inter-
national agreements affecting procurement—
will be the sole agreement guaranteeing U.S. 
exporters access to the Canadian markets. See 
generally Government Procurement Agreements 
Contain Similar Provisions, but Market Access 
Commitments Vary (GAO-16-727, Sept. 2016) 
(noting access afforded by GPA), www.gao.gov/
assets/690/680044.pdf. 
•	 Expanding	Price	Preferences	Under	 the	Buy	
American Act: Finally, and as expected, Trump 
has now called for an expansion of price prefer-
ences under the Buy American Act. See, e.g., 
Choi, “ ‘Buy American and Hire American’: 
President Trump’s Options for Strengthening 
the Buy American Act,” 47 Pub. Cont. L.J. 79, 
85 (2017). Because of the various curbs on the 
Buy American Act, discussed above, this latest 
order probably will have no material impact 
on the U.S. trade deficit, which in 2018 was 
$621 billion—roughly 80 times larger than the 
federal market potentially subject to the Buy 
American Act. In sum, the practical impact 
¶ 219
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of the latest EO is likely to be very limited 
because the Buy American Act plays a very 
small  role in the modern federal procurement 
market. 
The political impact of the new EO is likely to 
be much larger, both here and abroad. In the U.S., 
Trump’s political base probably will cheer this latest 
round of economic nationalism, although the new 
order can do little to restore the U.S. manufacturing 
base—the touchstone for the Trump administra-
tion’s protectionist efforts. Abroad, those in Europe 
and beyond who favor heightened protectionism may 
well point to this latest “Buy American” initiative 
as an excuse for new trade barriers in procurement. 
Although the Buy American Act has grown far less 
relevant since it was passed in 1933, for foreigners it 
is consistently a rallying point for protectionism—if 
the Americans have a strong Buy American Act, the 
argument goes, why shouldn’t we? The Trump admin-
istration’s latest protectionist measure will almost 
certainly encourage new barriers to international 
trade, and thus may cause new divisions in the com-
munity of nations.
F
This Feature Comment was written for The 
GovernmenT ConTraCTor by Professor Christopher 
R. Yukins of the George Washington University 
Law School in Washington, D.C.
